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Some of the most heated events related to the 2017 Turkish referendum, which 
significantly amended the country's constitution, did not take place in Turkey but in 
several European countries where a large number of Turkish citizens reside. The 
tension escalated when the Netherlands barred a plane carrying the Turkish Minister 
for Foreign Affairs from landing on Dutch soil and then prevented the Turkish Family 
and Social Policies Minister from accessing the Turkish Consulate in Rotterdam. This 
triggered what has been described as an unprecedented diplomatic crisis between two 
NATO allies. Turkey vigorously claimed that the Netherlands' behaviour breached 
the law of diplomatic and consular relations. The Netherlands, in turn, defended its 
actions, stating that they did not amount to a violation of international law. The 
present article will first provide an overview of these events and introduce the claims 
that were made by each side. Secondly, this article will briefly analyse the relevant 
treaty provisions and customary rules to ascertain whether Foreign Ministers enjoy a 
special status while visiting a third country and whether consular premises can 
legitimately be used to carry out political activities, ultimately challenging Turkey’s 
claims that the Netherlands violated international law. 
Keywords: Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations, customary international law, diplomatic 
immunities and privileges  
                                                 
* Senior Research Fellow, Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa, Italy. 
† Director of the Dirpolis Institute, Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa, Italy. 
‡ In this joint contribution, sections I and III have been authored by Dr. Capone 
and sections II and IV by Prof. de Guttry. 
62 European Journal of Legal Studies  {Vol. 10 No. 1 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 62 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL CLAIMS BROUGHT FORWARD BY  
TURKEY AND THE NETHERLANDS ............................................................... 66 
1. The Alleged Violations of International Law Claimed by Turkey ....................... 68 
2. The Counter-Arguments Advanced by the Netherlands ........................................ 69 
III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE CLAIMS AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF THE  
 CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK ..................................... 72 
1. The Immunities and Privileges Enjoyed by Foreign Ministries in a 
Third Country .......................................................................................................... 72 
2. The Legal Status of Diplomatic and Consular Premises ........................................ 77 
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS ............................................................................... 78 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Turkish constitutional referendum, which took place on the 16th of April 
2017, has not been treated merely as a matter of internal affairs. The 
referendum was a source of escalating tensions between Turkey and several 
European Union ('EU') Member States, including Germany, Austria, 
Belgium and the Netherlands. Relations between Turkey and the EU 
deteriorated last year when the Member States harshly criticised Turkish 
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan for a mass crackdown on political 
opponents in the wake of a failed coup. The referendum to change the 
Turkish Constitution from a parliamentary to a presidential system further 
exacerbated the divide between Turkey and its historical Western allies, 
because the proposed constitutional amendments were likely to result in 'the 
excessive concentration of powers in one office, with serious effects on the 
necessary checks and balances and on the independence of the judiciary'.1 
Now that the constitutional changes have been approved, they will allow 
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to run for the redefined office of President 
                                                 
1 European Commission, Joint Statement by High Representative/Vice-President 
Federica Mogherini and Commissioner Johannes Hahn on the Venice 
Commission's Opinion on the amendments to the Constitution of Turkey and 
recent events (2017) Statement/17/588.  
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for another two terms in the next Turkish elections in 2019, meaning that he 
could hold power until 2029.  
Even though it was contrary to Turkey's own domestic legislation,2 ahead of 
the referendum, Turkey dispatched high-level politicians, particularly 
Government Ministers, to a number of European countries. To campaign for 
the 'Yes' vote, Turkey sought to organise rallies in European cities and towns 
that had large populations of Turkish expatriates.3 It is estimated that the 
number of Turkish nationals living abroad exceeds 5.5 million, around 4.6 
million of which live in Western European countries4 such as Germany and 
the Netherlands. The campaign in these countries was thus crucial for 
gaining the vote of the 'diaspora' community.5 In the end, the diaspora's vote 
indeed played a decisive role in the outcome of the referendum, showing 
greater support for the constitutional reform than the home vote.6 
                                                 
2 Art 94/A of Turkish electoral law explicitly bans campaigning abroad or in foreign 
diplomatic missions: Law No 298 of 1961 on Basic Provisions on Elections and 
Voter Registers, 4.t. Register, vol I – 2553. 
3 See Betigül E Argun, Turkey in Germany: The Transnational Sphere of Deutschkei 
(Routledge 2003); Rainer Bauböck, 'Stakeholder Citizenship and Transnational 
Political Participation: A Normative Evaluation of External Voting' (2007) 75 
Fordham Law Review 2939; as explained by the author, the term 'expatriates' refers 
to citizens who live permanently or temporarily outside their country of 
citizenship.  
4 Françoise de Bel-Air, 'Migration Profile: Turkey' (2016) Policy Brief, Robert 
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 9 <www.cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/ 
1814/45145/MPC_PB_2016_09.pdf?sequence=1> accessed 20 June 2017. 
5 On the external voting rights of foreign citizens residing abroad, see generally Jean-
Michel Lafleur, Transnational Politics and the State: The External Voting Rights of 
Diasporas (Routledge 2013); Francesco Ragazzi, 'A Comparative Analysis of 
Diaspora Policies' (2014) 41 Political Geography 74; Sybil Rhodes and Arus 
Harutyunyan, 'Extending Citizenship to Emigrants: Democratic Contestation and 
a New Global Norm' (2010) 31 International Political Science Review 470, 475-480; 
Jose Itzigsohn, 'Immigration and the Boundaries of Citizenship: The Institutions 
of Immigrants' Political Transnationalism' (2000) 34 International Migration 
Review 1126. 
6 The highest level of support was seen among Turks in Germany, Belgium, Austria 
and the Netherlands, with some 63, 75, 73 and 71 percent respectively being in 
favour of the proposed reforms. In contrast, in Turkey, the 'Yes' vote had about 
51.3 percent, as compared to 48.7 percent for the 'No' vote. The close referendum 
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The tension between Turkey and the EU countries began in Germany, on the 
2nd of March 2017, when the Turkish Justice Minister, Bekir Bozdağ, was 
expected to speak at a public rally organised by the Turkish community in the 
German town Gaggenau. The event was cancelled following the 
municipality's declaration that the hall allocated for the rally had been 
withdrawn due to concerns about parking space. Over the next couple of 
days, municipalities all over Germany cancelled several rallies in support of 
the Turkish referendum due to security concerns and/or technical issues. For 
example, the city of Hamburg banned a planned appearance of the Turkish 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, on the pretext that fire 
protection measures were insufficient. In a speech delivered in Istanbul on 
the 5th of March 2017, President Erdoğan called the German actions 'fascist' 
and claimed that 'they demonstrated that Germany has not moved on from 
its Nazi past'.7 
Later in March, while the row continued to escalate between Germany and 
Turkey, the Netherlands significantly worsened existing tensions. The 
Dutch government, first, barred a plane carrying the Turkish' Foreign Affairs 
Minister from landing on Dutch soil. Furthermore, the Turkish' Family and 
Social Policies Minister, Fatma Betül Sayan Kaya, who had reached the 
Netherlands from Germany by car, was prevented from visiting her country's 
consulate in Rotterdam. Fearing a serious disturbance of public order, the 
Mayor of Rotterdam issued an emergency order for the area outside of the 
Turkish Consulate General, and a police cordon was placed around it. The 
Dutch government explained that it considered the visits undesirable and 
that it 'could not cooperate in the public political campaigning of Turkish 
                                                 
result prompted a reaction on the part of the European Commission, which called 
on the Turkish authorities to seek the broadest possible national consensus in the 
implementation of the constitutional amendments: see European Commission, 
Statement by President Juncker, High Representative/Vice-President Mogherini 
and Commissioner Hahn on the referendum in Turkey (2017) Statement/17/981.  
7 Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, 'I Believe All Citizens will Unite at 'Yes' for 
the Future of Turkey' (5 March 2017) <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/72226/ 
turkiyenin-istikbali-icin-tum-vatandaslarin-evette-birlesecegine-
inaniyorum.html> accessed 7 May 2017. 
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Ministers in the Netherlands'.8 Turkey, in return, claimed that the 
Netherlands' actions violated international law, making explicit reference to 
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations ('VCDR'),9 the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations ('VCCR')10 and international human 
rights law ('IHRL'). Moreover, Turkey threatened to impose sanctions 
against the Netherlands and take the case before the European Court of 
Human Rights ('ECtHR').11 
Leaving aside political considerations and motivations, which have certainly 
played a major role in shaping these events, especially since the Dutch 
parliamentary elections took place just a few days after the 'diplomatic 
incident' with Turkey,12 the present article will analyse the feud from a legal 
point of view, which has not been adopted thus far. The article will first 
provide an overview of the key international legal claims and counter-claims 
that were raised by the parties involved in this unprecedented and much 
debated diplomatic dispute. Secondly, the article challenges the allegations 
vehemently brought forward by Turkey, that the Netherlands' actions 
amounted to a violation of the law of diplomatic and consular relations. The 
article will demonstrate that Turkey, to foster the engagement of Turkish 
nationals residing abroad in the upcoming referendum, took actions that 
required the expressed consent of the receiving State. In fact, Turkey 
wrongly assumed that its Ministers enjoyed a special status in a third country 
                                                 
8 The Netherlands Government statement concerning Turkish Minister Kaya's 
escorted departure (12 March 2017), <https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2017 
/03/12/government-statement-concerning-turkish-minister-kaya's-escorted-
departure> accessed 7 May 2017. 
9 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (adopted 18 April 1961, entered into 
force 24 April 1964) 500 UNTS 95 (VCDR). 
10 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (adopted 24 April 1963, entered into 
force 19 March 1967) 596 UNTS 261 (VCCR). 
11 Tuvan Gumrukcu and Tulay Karadeniz, 'Turkey Targets Dutch with Diplomatic 
Sanctions as 'Nazi' Row Escalates' Reuters (Ankara, 14 March 2017) <http://www. 
reuters.com/article/us-turkey-referendum-netherlandsidUSKBN16J0IU> 
accessed 7 May 2017.  
12 Tim Boersma, 'The Netherlands' Complicated Election Result, Explained' 
(Brookings Institute, 20 March 2017) <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-
from-chaos/2017/03/20/the-netherlands-complicated-election-result-explained/> 
accessed 12 May 2017.  
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and autonomously decided to use consular premises to carry out political 
activities, taking for granted the compatibility of this behaviour with the 
correct exercise of consular functions.13 
Since the focus of this analysis is limited to the law of diplomatic and consular 
relations, the present article will not discuss the other major question 
triggered by this row, i.e. whether the 'external' (or 'out-of-country') voting 
rights of third country citizens residing abroad are embedded in the current 
IHRL framework and to what extent such rights must be implemented 
and/or can be legitimately limited.14 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL CLAIMS BROUGHT FORWARD BY 
TURKEY AND THE NETHERLANDS 
Prior to diving into the legal issues that emerged during this diplomatic feud, 
a few caveats are necessary. In a nutshell, diplomatic relations entail 'the 
exercise by the sending government of state functions on the territory of the 
receiving state by licence of the latter'.15 Once the receiving State has agreed 
to the establishment of diplomatic relations, which in the case of the 
Netherlands and Turkey occurred in 1612,16 it must enable the sending State 
to benefit from the content of the licence. This obligation results, inter alia, 
                                                 
13 Art 5 VCCR (n 10). 
14 See on this point, Richard Lappin, 'The Right to Vote for non-Resident Citizens 
in Europe', (2016) 65 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 859, 861-63; 
Michael Collyer, 'A Geography of Extra-Territorial Citizenship: Explanations of 
External Voting' (2014) 2(1) Migration Studies 55, 67; Ruth Rubio-Marin, 
'Transnational Politics and the Democratic Nation-State: Normative Challenges 
of Expatriate Voting and Nationality Retention of Emigrants' (2006) 81 New York 
University Law Review 117; Frédéric Mégret and Raphaël Girard, 'Diasporas, 
Extraterritorial Representation and the Right to Vote' (2014) 52 Canadian 
Yearbook of International Law 189. 
15 See Alan James, 'Diplomatic Relations and Contacts' (1992) 62 (1) British Yearbook 
of International Law 347, 354-57; James Crawford, Brownlie's Principles of Public 
International Law (8th edn, Oxford University Press 2013) 397.  
16 As reported by the Dutch Government, 'Relations between the Netherlands and 
Turkey', <https://www.government.nl/topics/international-relations/overview-
countries-and-regions/turkey> accessed 20 June 2017. 
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in a body of privileges and immunities,17 in the observance of legal duties by 
the receiving State,18 and in the mission's inviolability.19 
Formally speaking, consular relations are distinct from diplomatic 
relations,20 meaning that two States may have consular relations but not 
diplomatic relations, and vice versa. In part, this distinction is derived from 
the fact that historically, the functions of a consul were quite different from 
those of a diplomat, with the former being regarded as an agent 'deprived of 
representative character'.21 This difference ultimately led to the codification 
of two separate Conventions, i.e. the VCDR and VCCR, both of which are 
relevant to the present analysis and form the core of diplomatic and consular 
law.22 While the VCDR codifies the customary rules regarding bilateral 
diplomatic relations between States and its provisions have largely become 
part of general international law, the VCCR embodies a general framework 
of minimum standards for consular relations.23 Furthermore, both 
                                                 
17 Eileen Denza, Diplomatic Law: Commentary on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations (4th edn, Oxford University Press 2016) 232; Ivor Roberts, Satow's 
Diplomatic Practice (6th edn, Oxford University Press 2009) 97; Bhagevatula Murty, 
The International Law of Diplomacy: The Diplomatic Instrument and World Public 
Order (Springer 1989) 5; Jonathan Brown, 'Diplomatic Immunity: State Practice 
under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations' (1988) 37 International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly 53. 
18 See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (Hostages Case) (United States 
of America v Iran) (Merits) [1980] ICJ Rep, para 62. The Court highlighted that 
such obligations concerning the inviolability of the members of a diplomatic 
mission and of the premises, property and archives of the mission continued even 
in cases of armed conflict or the breach of diplomatic relations. See Kazimierz 
Gryzbowski, 'The Regime of Diplomacy and the Tehran Hostages' (1981) 30 
International & Comparative Law Quarterly 42. 
19 Crawford (n 15) 402. 
20 James (n 15) 356. 
21 John R Wood and Jean Serres, Diplomatic Ceremonial and Protocol, Principles, 
Procedures, and Practices (Macmillan 1970) 64. 
22 Jan Wouters, Sanderijn Duquet and Katrien Meuwissen, 'The Vienna 
Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations' in Andrew F Cooper, Jorge 
Heine and Ramesh Thakur (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy 
(Oxford University Press 2013) 510-543.  
23 Luke T Lee and John B Quigley, Consular Law and Practice (3rd edn, Oxford 
University Press 2008) 107. 
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Conventions affirm the inviolability of the mission's premises, which are 
defined as the buildings or parts of buildings and the land ancillary thereto, 
irrespective of ownership, used exclusively for the purposes of the consular 
post or the diplomatic mission.24 The consular and diplomatic premises 
cannot be accessed by the agents of the receiving State without the expressed 
consent of the head of the mission, and the receiving State is under a special 
duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission 
against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace 
of the mission or impairment of its dignity.25  
This brief overview of the law of diplomatic and consular relations is essential 
in framing the issues brought forward by Turkey and the Netherlands' 
response. In light of the existing legal framework, it is possible to identify the 
main claims advanced in the dispute, which can be summarised in two points. 
The first concerns the immunities and privileges enjoyed by Foreign 
Ministries in a third country, while the second pertains to the legal status of 
diplomatic and consular premises. 
1. The Alleged Violations of International Law Claimed by Turkey  
Following the events briefly presented in the introduction, the Turkish 
government was not shy in voicing its disappointment with and anger 
towards the Netherlands. President Erdoğan accused the Dutch 
government's behaviour as violating 'diplomacy and international law'.26 
With regard to the status of the two Turkish Ministries involved in the row, 
the Turkish' President initially only protested the denial of landing permits 
to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and denounced it as 'a scandal in every 
way'. Later he also affirmed that 'a woman minister of Turkey does not need 
any permission to meet with her citizens inside her own country's 
                                                 
24 Art 1 VCCR (n 10) and Art 1 VCDR (n 9). In the case of the VCDR, the premises 
of the mission also include the residence of the head of the mission. 
25 Art 22 VCDR (n 9) and Art 31 VCCR (n 10). It shall be noted that Art 31 para 3 of 
the VCCR provides for an explicit exception to the inviolability principle because 
it states that 'the consent of the head of the consular post may, however, be 
assumed in case of fire or other disaster requiring prompt protective action.' 
26 Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, 'I Call on All International Organizations to 
Impose Sanctions on the Netherlands', 12 March 2017, <https://www.tccb.gov. 
tr/en/search/?s=the%20Netherlands> accessed 20 June 2017.  
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consulate'.27 Furthermore, President Erdoğan asserted that '[a]ccording to 
international law, embassies and consulates are territories of the States they 
represent. In other words, both the Embassy and the Consulate in the 
Netherlands are our territory'.28 He also openly condemned the municipality 
of Rotterdam's declaration of a state of emergency for the area surrounding 
the Turkish Consulate-General. According to him, this declaration breached 
the obligation to respect the inviolability of the consular premises, solely in 
order to prevent the Minister from leaving her car and to halt the 'peaceful 
demonstration' of the Turkish citizens who had gathered outside the 
building to protest against the Netherlands government's' actions.29 
In response to the Dutch government's conduct, Turkey retaliated by barring 
planes carrying Dutch diplomats or envoys from landing in Turkey or using 
Turkish airspace. Moreover, based on the assumption that the Netherlands' 
actions gave rise to breaches of international law, Turkey called on 
international organizations to implement sanctions against the Netherlands 
and ultimately submitted an official note to the UN Secretary-General to 
complain about violations of the VCDR and the VCCR.30 
2. The Counter-Arguments Advanced by the Netherlands 
In response to Turkey's accusations, the Dutch government made its 
counter-claims public. With regard to the denial of landing rights to the 
Turkish' Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands reported that 
discussions with the Turkish authorities were underway regarding the 
Minister's visit. According to a statement published by the Dutch 
government, the two parties had talked about possibly 'moving the meeting 
to a Turkish consulate or embassy, closing it to the public and organising it 
                                                 
27 Presidency on Turkey (n 26). 
28 Ibid (emphasis added). 
29 Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, 'The Whole Europe Has Got Mobilized for 
'No' in April 16 Referendum', 15 March 2017, <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/search/ 
?s=the%20Netherlands> accessed 15 May 2017. 
30 The original text of the note has not been made public, but the news has been 
reported by several news agencies. See Canberk Yüksel, Turkey Notifies UN of 
Dutch Government's International Law Breaches, Anadolu Agency, 16 March 
2017, <http://aa.com.tr/en/americas/turkey-notifies-un-of-dutch-govts-intl-law-
breaches/ 772544> accessed 15 May 2017.   
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on a smaller scale'.31 The Dutch government had indicated that in any case, 
Turkey's Minister of Foreign Affairs would 'not be welcome in his official 
capacity, but that arrangements could be made for a visit by him as a private 
individual'.32 While discussions were still in progress regarding the details 
(with a view to maintaining public order) of the Minister's visit as a private 
individual, Mr. Çavuşoğlu appeared on CNN Turk on the morning of 
Saturday, the 11th of March 2017, and threatened the Netherlands with 
economic and political sanctions, should his aircraft be prevented from 
landing.33 These threats made the quest for a reasonable compromise 
impossible and led to the Dutch government's decision to deny landing 
rights.34 The Dutch government also explained that in principle, it had no 
objections to hosting meetings to inform the Turkish citizens residing on its 
territory about the referendum; however, such meetings had to comply with 
the Netherlands' 'justified concerns regarding public order'.35 
In relation to the Turkish Minister of Family and Social Policies, the Dutch 
government stressed that the decision to organise the visit was made 
unilaterally. The Turkish authorities did not agree to share information 
about the Minister's travel plans, and deliberate efforts were made to mislead 
the Dutch authorities so as to ensure that Ms. Kaya could travel to 
Rotterdam without hindrance.36 According to the Netherlands, Ms. Kaya did 
not enjoy any special status in the Netherlands, because: 
                                                 
31 Government statement on the denial of Turkish landing rights, 11 March 2017, 
<https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2017/03/11/government-statement-on-
the-denial-of-turkish-landing-rights> accessed 15 May 2017. 
32 Letter of 10 April 2017 from the Prime Minister, the Minister of Social Affairs and 
Employment and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in conjunction with the Minister 
of Security and Justice and the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, to 
the House of Representatives on attempted campaign appearances by Turkish 
ministers (Letter to the House of Representatives), 10 April 2017, <https://www. 
government.nl/documents/parliamentary-documents/2017/04/13/letter-to-the-
house-of-representatives-on-campaign-appaearances-by-turkish-ministers> 
accessed 15 May 2017.  
33 Ibid. 
34 Government statement on the denial of Turkish landing rights (n 31). 
35 Letter to the House of Representatives (n 32).  
36 Ibid.  
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International law grants a special status only to (1) heads of State, heads of 
Government and foreign ministers, (2) diplomatic and consular staff who 
have been accredited or whose appointment has been notified to the 
Netherlands, and (3) foreign officials on official missions, for which an 
invitation from the Netherlands is required. Ms. Kaya did not fall within any 
of these categories.37 
In other words, the Dutch government reached the conclusion that even 
though Ms. Kaya was a foreign government official, she did not enjoy the 
privileges and immunities given to specific officials under the current 
international legal framework. Furthermore, the Dutch government 
underlined that a foreign government official does not have the right to enter 
the Netherlands in order to carry out political activities. Once present in the 
Netherlands, a foreign government official has the right to freedom of 
expression, but 'restrictions can be applied if there are sufficient grounds.'38 
This is consistent with the European Convention on Human Rights 
('ECHR'),39 in particular, with the provision enshrined in Article 16, 
according to which 'nothing in Articles 10, 11 and 14 shall be regarded as 
preventing the High Contracting Parties from imposing restrictions on the 
political activity of aliens'.40 
With regard to the emergency order issued for the area surrounding the 
Turkish Consulate in Rotterdam, the Dutch government did not provide any 
legal justification and simply reiterated that the decision was made to avoid 
'a serious public order disturbance'.41 
                                                 
37 Letter to the House of Representatives (n 32).  
38 Ibid.  
39 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(European Convention on Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR).  
40 The European Court of Human Rights' jurisprudence concerning Art 16 is very 
limited. See, for instance, Piermont v France (1995) 20 EHRR 301.  
41 Letter to the House of Representatives (n 32). See also Government statement 
concerning Turkish Minister Kaya's escorted departure, 12 March 2017, 
<https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2017/03/12/government-statement-
concerning-turkish-minister-kaya's-escorted-departure> accessed 18 May 2017.  
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III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE CLAIMS AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF THE  
CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The following section addresses the two main claims brought forward by 
Turkey and assesses their legitimacy or lack thereof, in light of the existing 
legal framework governing diplomatic and consular relations between States. 
By expanding and deepening the counter-arguments already presented by the 
Dutch government (outlined in the section above), the following section will 
provide a detailed overview of the international treaty provisions and 
customary rules that are most relevant to the present analysis. 
1. The Immunities and Privileges Enjoyed by Foreign Ministries in a Third Country 
The first question to address concerns the status enjoyed by foreign ministers 
abroad – more specifically, whether the denial of landing rights to the 
Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs and the lack of recognition of any 
privileges pertaining to the Turkish Minister of Family and Social Policies 
amount to violations of the law of diplomatic and consular relations. With 
regard to the dispute over the alleged violations committed against Mr. 
Çavuşoğlu, it is worth noting that the status of a Minister of Foreign Affairs 
is not fully outlined in the existing treaty law.42 However, in the Arrest 
Warrant case, the International Court of Justice ('ICJ') provided a brief 
analysis of the nature of the functions attached to this role: 
There is a presumption that a Minister for Foreign Affairs, simply by virtue 
of that office, has full powers to act on behalf of the State […] In the 
performance of these functions, he or she is frequently required to travel 
                                                 
42 Art 21, para 2 Convention on Special Missions (adopted 8 December 1996, entered 
into force 21 June 1985) 1400 UNTS 231, which states that '[t]he Head of the 
Government, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and other persons of high rank, when 
they take part in a special mission of the sending State, shall enjoy in the receiving 
State or in a third State, in addition to what is granted by the present Convention, 
the facilities, privileges and immunities accorded by international law'. See Art 7, 
para 2(a) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 22 May 1969, entered 
into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331, according to which 'In virtue of their 
functions and without having to produce full powers, the following are considered 
as representing their State: (a) Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers 
for Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of performing all acts relating to the conclusion 
of a treaty […]'.  
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internationally, and thus must be in a position freely to do so whenever the need should 
arise.43 
In sum, according to the ICJ, under international law, a Minister of Foreign 
Affairs is recognised as the representative of the State solely by virtue of his 
or her office. He or she must be in a position to travel and communicate freely 
in the performance of this function.44 A Minister of Foreign Affairs thus 
enjoys all privileges and immunities granted by the VCDR. 
However, as stated in the Convention, 'it is the duty of all persons enjoying 
such privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of the 
receiving State. They also have a duty not to interfere in the internal affairs of that 
State.'45 Furthermore, according to the VCDR, '[a]ll official business with the 
receiving State entrusted to the mission by the sending State shall be conducted 
with or through the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the receiving State or such other 
ministry as may be agreed.'46 The Dutch government explained that it had no 
intention of welcoming the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs in his official 
capacity. First, the Netherlands could not be used as a political campaign area 
for other countries and the rallies would have the potential to create divisions 
within the Dutch Turkish minority, which had both pro- and anti-
referendum camps.47 Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that the 
Dutch government denied landing rights and access to its territory to the 
Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs as a form of retorsion following his public 
threats.48 
                                                 
43 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) 
(Judgment) [2002] ICJ Rep 3, paras 53-54 (emphasis added).  
44 Neil Boister, 'The ICJ in the Belgian Arrest Warrant Case: Arresting the 
Development of International Criminal Law' (2002) 7(2) Journal of Conflict and 
Security Law 293, 298. 
45 Art 41, para 1 VCDR (n 9) (emphasis added). 
46 Art 41, para 2 VCDR (n 9) (emphasis added). 
47 Letter to the House of Representatives (n 32).  
48 Measures of retorsion amount to unfriendly acts at most, i.e. acts that are wrong 
not in the legal sense but only in the political or moral sense, or a simple discourtesy. 
Moreover, acts of retorsion may include the prohibition of or placing of limitations 
upon normal diplomatic relations or other contacts, embargoes of various kinds or 
the withdrawal of voluntary aid programmes. See ILC, 'Report of the International 
Law Commission on the work of its 53rd Session' (23 April – 1 June and 2 July – 10 
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With regard to the Minister's threats, two further considerations can be 
made. Firstly, calling on international organizations to impose sanctions 
against the Netherlands highlights Turkey's firm and de facto unjustified 
notion of itself as the victim of conduct that is contrary to international 
obligations.49 Secondly, it could be argued that even though the Netherlands 
did not raise this claim, these threats amounted to a breach of international 
customary law, according to which 'no State may use or encourage the use of 
economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order 
to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure 
from it advantages of any kind.'50 
In relation to the Turkish Minister of Family and Social Policies, the main 
argument advanced by Turkey was that she – like the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs - also enjoyed a special status, whereas the Netherlands claimed that 
she did not. As stressed by international law expert, Ivor Roberts, 'the 
conduct of business with other States is no longer confined to the Minister 
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Nossal, 'International Sanctions as International Punishment' (1989) 43 (2) 
International Organization 301, 305.  
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for Foreign Affairs.'51 This position is shared by the ICJ, which in regard to 
the authority of a Minister other than the Minister of Foreign Affairs to bind 
the State in matters of international relations, noted that: 
[…] with increasing frequency in modern international relations other 
persons representing a State in specific fields may be authorized by that State 
to bind it by their statements in respect of matters falling within their 
purview. This may be true, for example, of holders of technical ministerial 
portfolios exercising powers in their field of competence in the area of 
foreign relations, and even of certain officials.52 
It can also be assumed that the Turkish Minister of Family and Social Policies 
was sent to the Netherlands in her capacity as an official visitor within the 
framework of so-called ‘special missions’, also known as 'ad hoc diplomacy’.53 
Official visitors who are members of a special mission and represent the 
sending State in its bilateral or multilateral relations enjoy, for the duration 
of the visit, the same inviolability of the person and immunity from criminal 
jurisdiction as persons of equivalent rank accredited to a permanent 
diplomatic mission. This includes the receiving State’s obligation to treat 
them with due respect and to take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack 
on their persons, freedom or dignity.54 
The legal status of such missions, which pre-dates the creation of the current 
system of permanent diplomatic missions, has begun to draw greater 
attention in recent years.55 The Convention on Special Missions seeks to set 
                                                 
51 Roberts (n 17) 31.  
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out the rules governing the conduct of ad hoc diplomacy. This Convention 
defines a 'special mission' as 'a temporary mission, representing the State, 
which is sent by one State to another State with the consent of the latter for 
the purpose of dealing with it on specific questions or of performing in 
relation to it a specific task'.56 However, this Convention has attracted 
limited participation, and neither the Netherlands nor Turkey is party to it. 
It is therefore challenging to ascertain the extent to which persons occupying 
high-ranking offices are entitled to ‘special mission status’ and, thus, enjoy 
absolute immunity from criminal jurisdiction or inviolability ratione personae 
while on an official visit to a third country.  
Nonetheless, the relevant State practice and the broad outlines of customary 
law confirm that two key requirements must be met: i) that the official visitor 
represents the sending State and ii) that the receiving State has consented to 
the visit as a visit attracting immunity.57 Concerning the latter key 
requirement, it should be noted that the receiving State's consent entails the 
following: 
[…] at a minimum, that the receiving State has agreed with the sending State 
that the sending State shall send the person to the receiving State as an 
official visitor entitled to immunity. It is not normally sufficient, to establish 
'consent', that the immigration authorities have permitted the person to 
enter, or that a visa has been issued.58 
The Netherlands did not consent to the Minister's visit, nor could the 
necessary consent be implied from the surrounding circumstances, because 
the Dutch authorities had clearly expressed their unwillingness to host 
political rallies organised by the Turkish Government.59 It follows that the 
Netherlands did not violate international law by denying special status to the 
Turkish Minister of Family and Social Policies.  
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2. The Legal Status of Diplomatic and Consular Premises 
The second main point raised in the dispute between the Netherlands and 
Turkey concerns the status of diplomatic and consular premises. Turkey's 
claim that embassies and consulates are territories of the States they 
represent is ill-founded and ultimately wrong. The inviolability of the 
diplomatic and consular premises,60 in fact, must not be confused with 
extraterritoriality, because such premises do not constitute part of the 
territory of the sending State.61 The maintenance of public order remains a 
prerogative of the receiving State, and therefore, the emergency order issued 
by the Netherlands outside the premises of the Turkish Consulate in 
Rotterdam did not breach any of the obligations of the receiving State. 
Pushing this argument further, it could even be argued that the emergency 
order was a measure taken to fulfil the receiving State's duty to prevent the 
disturbance of the peace of the mission or the impairment of its dignity.62  
Whereas the Netherlands' actions do not appear to be in violation of the law 
of consular relations, it should be stressed that Turkey's intention to use the 
consular premises to host a political rally may have been contrary to the 
VCCR. The Convention states that '[t]he consular premises shall not be used 
in any manner incompatible with the exercise of consular functions.'63 Political 
activities are not excluded tout court, because non-enumerated consular 
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functions are possible under the VCCR.64 Such functions, however, must not 
be prohibited by the laws and regulations of the receiving State or be openly 
objected to by the receiving State. Inasmuch as the Dutch authorities expressed 
a clear aversion to the possibility that Turkey would carry out an electoral 
campaign on Dutch territory, these exceptions did not apply in the case at 
issue.  
In conclusion, a diplomatic row that risked the relationship between two 
historic allies was triggered by Turkey's erroneous assumption that certain 
types of conduct could be carried out in another State's territory without that 
State's expressed consent and in compliance with the law of diplomatic and 
consular relations.  
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The diplomatic crisis between Turkey and the Netherlands was 
predominantly guided by political considerations. Despite – or perhaps 
because of – the row, in the end, President Erdoğan declared victory in a 
narrowly divided referendum, and the results of the Dutch parliamentary 
elections succeeded in halting the advance of resurgent nationalism. The 
votes of Turkish citizens residing abroad were of crucial importance, because 
the highest level of support for the referendum was registered in Western 
European countries. In the aftermath of the referendum, journalists, experts, 
politicians and academics have questioned why many Turkish voters opted 
for the authoritarian changes, despite the fact that they had lived in liberal 
democracies for many years. Furthermore, much consideration has been 
devoted to understanding the extent to which the tension with several EU 
countries boosted President Erdoğan's campaign.  
Little attention, instead, was paid to the aspects of the diplomatic crisis that 
concerned the international legal framework. In order to fill this gap, the 
present article focused on the law of diplomatic and consular relations and 
showed that the Netherlands' conduct did not violate any of the relevant 
rules. Furthermore, this article has demonstrated that Turkey's arguments 
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rested on incorrect legal assumptions, i.e. the alleged enjoyment of a special 
status by its Ministers while on foreign soil and the claim that embassies and 
consulates are de facto parts of Turkish territory.  
Notably, the row between Turkey and the Netherlands has also triggered a 
number of issues pertaining to the sphere of IHRL, which have not been 
addressed in this article, given its focus on the law of diplomatic and consular 
relations. For example, it could be argued that the emergency order issued by 
the municipality of Rotterdam had an impact on the Minister's freedom of 
movement and expression, and one could question whether the restrictions 
implemented were in line with the provision enshrined in Article 16 ECHR.65 
Those issues could perhaps form the focus of an unlikely inter-State 
application should Turkey move forward with its threat to lodge a case before 
the ECtHR.66 In conclusion, even though some measure of politics will 
always guide each and every interaction among States,67 it is worth stressing 
that over the centuries, diplomatic and consular practice has been duly 
systematised into legal rules. States' subjective needs and desires must be 
restricted by non-political deliberations, at least in those fields of 
international law that are sufficiently developed to provide States' 
representatives with adequate tools to avoid actions and/or reactions that 
rest on incorrect legal assumptions.
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